The Role of Ancillary Motivations in Xunzi’s Thought

I. Introduction

Early Confucians suggest various attitudes or modes of behavior, such as respectfulness, carefulness, polite deference, and humility. These are adopted to practice the core Confucian values or principles, such as Dao 道 (the Way), renli 仁義 (the Confucian formal rules of conduct), and liyi 禮義 (propriety). At some point, however, Xunzi seems to allow one to take those attitudes or actions out of self-interest. More particularly, in the “Zhongni” 仲尼 chapter, Xunzi appears to suggest that the king’s subject should take some of the aforementioned attitudes or actions to win the king’s favor and be chosen as his minister. If this reading is correct, Xunzi allows one’s self-interest, rather than the proper motives, namely a desire for realizing the core Confucian values, to provide at least part of the motivation that leads one to take the Confucian attitudes or actions. For convenience, I call this “the problem of wrong motivations.” In fact, the above reading is not correct when considered in the broader context of the Xunzi. I suggest another reading of the relevant passages that does not evoke the problem of wrong motivations.

On the other hand, the above reading is not entirely misleading because it cannot be denied that in the relevant passages Xunzi considers the intervention of a certain extra motive to be sometimes inevitable in addition to the proper motives for pursuing the core Confucian values. The question is how to characterize this extra motive in a way that avoids the problem of wrong motivations.

Moreover, in handling this question, there is another criterion that the characterization of the extra motive should meet, namely motivational purity. For Xunzi, one should be motivated single-heartedly to pursue the core Confucian values. With this criterion in mind, I attempt to characterize the extra motive in question as “the ancillary motivation,” which operates without causing one’s motivational set to be impure.

II. Wrong Motivations

Scrutiny of the three tactics (術) in the “Zhongni” chapter reveals conflicting ideas among them. The first and second tactics may cause the problem of wrong motivations, whereas the third does not. The heading of the first tactic is a brief summary of the matters the tactic deals with.¹ According to this summary, the tactic is used by the minister to keep his position as the king’s favorite and to maintain his political status without earning the enmity of others. To achieve these goals, Xunzi suggests, one should take up and pursue an extensive array of attitudes and actions. More particularly, he says:

If the ruler bestows high rank on you and exalts you, be respectful (恭敬 gongjing) to him and restrain yourself; if the ruler trusts you and treats you closely, be careful and circumspect (謹愼 jinshen) and let your demeanor show as if you are wanting in, for example, ability; even if the ruler treats you with distance, strive for complete oneness with him but do not betray him. Also, when you are in a high position, do not boast; when trusted, exercise humility (謙 qian); when you are offered riches and benefits, accept them only after refusing (辭讓 cirang) them politely and deferring to the ruler first, as if your good accomplishments do not deserve them.²

In this tactic, Xunzi mentions many more attitudes or actions, not just respectfulness, carefulness, humility, and polite deference as in the above. As is widely understood, all of those aim to enable one to practice the core Confucian values or principles, such as Dao, li, and li yi. For instance, in a passage of the Xunzi, respectfulness is mentioned as the manifestation of li.³ In the same passage, the gentleman (君子 junzi) is described as someone who finds ease in li and takes the attitude of carefulness, so that he would not do wrong no matter what action he takes.⁴ In addition, Xunzi understands polite deference as what the ideal rulers, Tang and Wu, were adept at practicing.

Similarly, the heading of the second tactic is a brief summary of its function. It explains the second tactic as a method of excelling when holding a position of great importance and handling important matters appropriately, of gaining the favor of the ruler over a state of ten thousand chariots, and of being sure to eliminate sources of possible troubles for yourself.⁵ The second tactic suggests humility as well as the similar attitudes or actions mentioned above. It states, “In the conduct of official duties, the wise person, when he has the full amount, considers being deficient.”⁶ This figurative expression means that even after having fulfilled his duties, the wise person behaves as if he was deficient in his ability, quality, and the like. Moreover, the tactic ends by quoting the following saying of Confucius: “If a person is wise and still devoted to qian, he must be a worthy.”⁷

A tactic generally refers to a certain method adopted to achieve what you want, and, therefore, an attitude or action taken in the process of following a tactic inevitably evokes the thought of achieving a certain goal. The targeted goals in the headings of the first two tactics, namely winning the favor of the ruler, maintaining one’s political position by not losing the favor of the ruler or one’s colleagues, and still getting rid of possible troubles for oneself, are likely to provoke self-interest. For instance, if a person is respectful to others or behaves as if he does not really deserve his own accomplishments, he should be esteemed highly by others. However, if the person takes such attitudes to win the favor of a man of power and to remain in a high post, he seeks self-interest under the disguise of what is highly esteemed. Here, in the worst case, selfishness is camouflaged with a hypocritical attitude or action. Otherwise, at least, the Confucian attitudes or actions are motivated wrongly out of self-interest. In such cases, the problem of wrong motivations can arise.

This suspicion grows stronger when the first two tactics are compared with the third, which has a different heading, “the tactic that can work for every occasion over the world.”⁸ By drawing upon this third tactic, Xunzi explains, you will gain mastery in serving the ruler and become a sage in developing your personhood.⁹ This tactic also suggests attitudes or actions very similar to those mentioned above. Unlike the previous tactics, however, it suggests that one should adopt these attitudes or actions in a way that enables one to stand firm with the Confucian ideals (lilong 立隆) single-heartedly (wuyi 勿貳).¹⁰ The term long 隆 here refers to the core Confucian values or principles.¹¹ The ultimate goal of using the third tactic, then, lies not in winning the ruler’s favor or avoiding any personal troubles in the future, but in practicing the Confucian core values or principles. In other words, the reason why one should not brag about one’s own accomplishments in the presence of the ruler is not that one wants not to lose the favor of the ruler, but that one can thereby be in compliance with the core Confucian values or principles. Thus understood, the adoption of this tactic does not provoke the problem of wrong motivations.

The disagreement between the first and the second tactics on the one hand and the third tactic on the other needs to be resolved to understand Xunzi’s thought more consistently. Prior to an attempt to resolve it in the following section, it is worth noting that another passage in the Xunzi may evoke the problem of wrong motivations. In the “Chendao” chapter, Xunzi says,

“If one is persecuted and oppressed by a chaotic age, reduced to a life of utter poverty in a violent state, and one lacks any means to escape, then one should promote the lord’s refinements, and extol his goodness, avoid his ugliness and conceal his failures, speak of his virtues but never refer to his shortcomings. Make this one’s established customs.”¹²

This suggestion sounds like a survival technique that one might adopt in a predicament, as Xunzi seems to suggest that one should ingratiate oneself with one’s superior by covering up his faults and highlighting only his merits. Then, one’s attitudes or actions toward the superior may be driven by one’s self interest. If this reading of the above passage is correct, Xunzi’s suggestion provokes the problem of wrong motivations.

III. Xunzi’s Warning against Flattery

The disagreement among the three tactics cannot be resolved within the context of the “Zhongni” chapter. Even so, the previous readings of the passages in the “Chendao” and “Zhongni” chapters are misleading in consideration of a broader context of the Xunzi. Throughout the “Chendao” chapter, Xunzi criticizes ingratiation or flattery.

More particularly, for instance, Xunzi introduces the four grades of good and bad ministers, namely sham ministers (態臣 taichen), presumptuous ministers, meritorious ministers, and sage ministers, and then criticizes sham minsters.¹³ One of its Chinese characters tai 態 means “looks” or “appearance,” and it is used in the expression tai chen to refer to the appearance of flattering the ruler.¹⁴ In detail, Xunzi describes sham minsters as follows:

“Not only are they ill-equipped at unifying the people inside of the state, but they are also ill-equipped to repel disturbances from outside. The hundred clans feel no kinship with them, and the feudal lords do not trust them. Nevertheless, they are cunning and nimble, and they are a sleek talker; thus they are good at winning favors from their superiors.”¹⁵

Here, his criticism of flattery is clear. In addition, in the same chapter, Xunzi exhorts one not to flatter a mediocre ruler but only to remonstrate and wrangle with him.¹⁶ In the relevant passages, Xunzi draws distinctions among different levels of rulers, namely a sage ruler (聖君), a mediocre ruler (中君), and a violent ruler (暴君), and suggests different treatments in interacting with each of them. Xunzi also says that the practice of yi in the service of a mediocre ruler lies in being loyal and truthful without ingratiating oneself with the ruler, and in remonstrating and wrangling with him without being dishonest through flattery (Li 2000, 295). Xunzi is clearly opposed to flattery that seeks personal benefit. In line with this firm position, the first two tactics in the “Zhongni” chapter should be read differently.

IV. The Model of Mixed Motivations

Then, how can the first two tactics be re-interpreted in a way that avoids the problem of wrong motivations? A possible way around this trouble is to reconsider the selfish desires that intervene in adopting the tactics to be only secondary. For example, one may be qian (humble) on the basis of a combination of different motivations rather than a single one, and the principal motivation is independent of the selfish motivations that only intervene secondarily. In other words, such a selfish motive for maintaining one’s own political position by not losing the favor of one’s superior can be understood as playing a subordinate role to the proper and primary motive for practicing the core Confucian values or principles. In this line of thought, it can be argued that insofar as the primary motive for being humble is independent of the selfish ones, one can sidestep the problem of wrong motivations.

The phenomenon of intervention by such subordinate motivations is common in our experience. In everyday life, human beings do not always act exclusively with a single motivation. For example, while a person extends efforts to help someone else out of sympathy, he may simultaneously be motivated to pursue a personal sense of happiness by carrying out such good deeds. This additional motivation is self-interested. Nevertheless, it does not make the agent completely misguided in helping the other, insofar as it does not become the stronger and encroach on the other motive. This model of mixed motivations may accommodate a richer and more concrete view of human actions in daily life. Moreover, Xunzi does not completely reject the pursuit of personal benefits. He approves of it on the condition that the pursuit does not violate the core Confucian values or principles. In this regard, he says that the gentleman desires personal advantages (利 li), and, yet, he would not do things of which he disapproves.¹⁷

Furthermore, this model has the theoretical advantage of uncovering what Xunzi may implicitly have in mind when he suggests the three different tactics of the “Zhongni” chapter in a sequential manner. Perhaps, Xunzi considers the process of self-cultivation, in the beginning of which human beings whose nature is selfish according to his widely known thesis that human nature is bad should have difficulty in following the Confucian Dao as such without having in mind any personal gain. For this reason, Xunzi may try to encourage a layperson in self-cultivation by following the first and second tactics, which partly allows the intervention of selfish motivations. According to this line of thought, the third tactic is what can be adopted by a well cultivated person who can follow the Confucian Dao without being helped by any subordinate motivation. In contrast, the first and second tactics have more to do with Xunzi’s conception of how a person should act in the process of self-cultivation rather than his conception of how a person should ideally act.¹⁸

The above lines of thought may be developed in a more detailed manner. Nevertheless, I do not steer the following discussion in that direction. In fact, Xunzi does not indicate such different levels of self-cultivation in terms of the three tactics in the “Zhongni” chapter, nor does he throughout the Xunzi.

On the other hand, the problematic motive in question may be understood not as a selfish one, but as an indispensable desire for self-preservation. In the “Rongru” chapter, Xunzi claims that the gentleman and the petty man are the same in liking what is beneficial and hating what is harmful.¹⁹ According to this, it can be claimed further that a gentleman, namely a well-cultivated person, may sometimes take polite deference mainly out of a proper motive for it, while having another desire for self-preservation in order to avoid harm against himself. Out of the latter, he may adopt the first or second tactic in the “Zhongni” chapter, thereby trying to win the favor of his superior. This extra motive can be a survival instinct for self-preservation in a predicament like dwelling “in a violent state” (in the “Chendao” chapter), rather than a selfish desire to increase one’s own private interests. The intervention of this extra desire may not be completely problematic from the perspective of early Confucians, if this need for self-preservation does not encroach upon the proper motives for taking the typical Confucian attitudes or actions.

V. The Criterion of Motivational Purity

No matter how the extra motive under discussion is understood, Xunzi would not accept the model of mixed motivations when understood in the form explained in the previous section. Even though Xunzi does not completely reject the pursuit of personal benefits, he firmly believes that the gentleman should courageously not look after his own benefit in meeting the requirement of yi.²⁰ In this regard, attention needs to be paid to the third tactic in the “Zhongni” chapter that asks one to take the Confucian attitudes or actions by standing firm with the Confucian ideals single-heartedly. This suggestion is another criterion to meet when a person ideally acts.

More particularly, as soon as any self-interested motivation intervenes in the mind of an agent in acting to pursue the Confucian values, the purity in his mind cannot help being contaminated. This loss of purity prevents the agent from being driven wholeheartedly by proper motives. In the case of Mencius, another early Confucian thinker, the basic motivation for urgently reaching for a crawling baby who is about to fall into a well is ceyin zhixin (惻隱之心), namely compassion for the impending pain to which the baby is clearly exposed. Mencius asserts that no motivation other than the compassion, especially any selfish one, intervenes in such an urgent situation (Yang 1996, 79-80). For instance, the desire to gain recognition from the village for the good deed, or to continue acquaintance with the baby’s parents for a selfish purpose, should not enter into the agent’s mind. The agent could presumably be all the more motivated to help the crawling baby by virtue of such additional desires for selfish gains.²¹ Nevertheless, this intervention is problematic from the viewpoint of motivational purity.

This idea of motivational purity is shared by Xunzi, as the aforementioned single-heartedness in the third tactic conveys this idea. It also reflects the notion of cheng 誠 (usually translated as sincerity), which is crucially discussed throughout many early Confucian texts, such as the Mencius and the “Daxue” 大學 chapter and the “Zhongyong” 中庸 chapter of the Liji 禮記. The “Bugou” chapter of the Xunzi contains a passage that promotes the notion, in which cheng is understood as the best way for a gentleman to cultivate his mind and make his mind have no other concern but upholding the core Confucian values.²² At this point, it is worth noting that the neo-Confucian Zhu Xi 朱熹 understands cheng as pertaining to the absence of any internal division of the mind oriented solely in one of the central neo-Confucian values or principles, li 理.²³

In short, the criterion of motivational purity has to do with maintaining cheng in the mind without the intervention of any other motives that leads to an internal division of the mind, thereby preventing the mind from being oriented entirely in pursuing the core Confucian values. Granting that Xunzi accepts the notion of cheng, the extra motives under discussion should be characterized without infringing the criterion of motivational purity.

VI. The Role of Ancillary Motivations in the Benign Model of Mixed Motivations

Based on the discussions in the previous sections, I examine another possibility that Xunzi does not consider the mixture of different motivations as such to be problematic. In the “Chendao” chapter, Xunzi says,

“If a person is worthy, and, yet, one does not respect him, this is [for one] to be a beast. If a person is unworthy, and, so, one does not respect him, this is [for one] to act like provoking a tiger. If one is like a beast, one will be in chaos. If one provokes a tiger, one will be in danger. Then disaster will reach one’s own body. . . . A ren (仁) person always respects others. There is an appropriate way for respecting other people: If a person is worthy, one honors him and respects him. If a person is unworthy, one fears him and respects him. If a person is worthy, one gives love to him and respects him. If a person is unworthy, one keeps him at a distance and respects him. In these cases, respect that one shows is one; the actual circumstances are twofold (其情二也).”²⁴

In the above passage, Xunzi explains different ways of showing respect to two kinds of people, namely a worthy person and an unworthy person. Especially, the treatment of the latter is compared to that of a tiger; in this respect, the latter is understood as a brutal person. Xunzi stresses that respect toward a brute is not different from respect toward a worthy person. In this regard, he says, “respect that one shows is one.” This means that even though there are distinctive ways of respecting different kinds of people, the main motivation is still the same kind of respect.²⁵

It is important to note how Xunzi explains the different ways of respecting, namely the ways of respecting a worthy person and a brute: He understands this difference in terms of the intervention of different attitudes or emotions, such as honoring (貴) and giving love (親), on the one hand, and fearing (畏) and keeping at a distance (疏), on the other. More particularly, according to Xunzi, one should fear a brute but nevertheless respect him because he would act like a tiger and harm one, otherwise. In the same vein, the intervention of any extra motive in adopting the first and second tactics in the “Zhongni” chapter can be understood as happening in treating a violent and brutal ruler.

However, the extra motive at issue is not necessarily a selfish desire or a basic desire for self-preservation. Instead, it needs to be characterized differently to meet the criterion of motivational purity. In the “Chendao” chapter, Xunzi points out that one’s ruler is not always a sage king but more likely a tyrant. He then suggests,

“In serving a sage king, one just needs to listen to his orders and follow him and should not remonstrate and wrangle with him. In serving a mediocre king, one needs to remonstrate and wrangle with him and should not flatter him. In serving a violent king, one needs to make up for what is lacking in him and to remove what is wrong with him and should not break with or oppose him.”²⁶

According to this passage, when serving a sage ruler, one just needs to pursue the realization of the Confucian core values or principles simply by following the ideal ruler. In contrast, when faced with unavoidable situations where one serves a tyrant, it would be impossible to abide doggedly by the Confucian principles. Under the regime of a violent ruler, it is pivotal to avoid being ousted by losing favor with the ruler or by incurring the jealousy of fellow ministers, assuming one wants to pursue the core Confucian values and practice the Confucian principles in the long run. Only then could one gradually have influence on the tyrant and change him, ultimately guiding him to govern his regime in a way that is at least close to wangdao 王道 (the Confucian way of the true king). In this respect, Xunzi mentions in the “Chendao” chapter, “To employ the Perfect Way to enlighten the ruler, but in nothing to be inharmonious or discordant, and so be able to alter and change him, being constantly mindful of getting him to accept this. Such are one’s moral obligations in the service of a cruel and violent ruler.”²⁷

In the process of establishing harmony with a tyrannical ruler, the desire not to lose his favor and thereby to maintain one’s political position may inevitably intervene in one’s attitude of serving the ruler. However, such a desire should not lead one to flatter the tyrant. Neither is it simply based on a basic desire for self-preservation. Rather, it aims ultimately at realizing the Confucian ideals in the long run, even in violent circumstances where one more often finds oneself.

Finally, the extra motive in question can be named “the ancillary motivation” to differentiate itself from the other candidates discussed so far, such as selfish desires or desires for self-preservation. It is characterized as a motive that aims at something that may simply be misrepresented as personal advantages in the short term, but that works eventually as a means to realize the core Confucian values in the long run. Then, the intervention of an ancillary motivation would not violate the criterion of motivational purity because it does not prevent one from being oriented single-heartedly in the pursuit of the core Confucian values in the long run.

VII. Concluding Remarks

The function of ancillary motivations cannot cross certain limits. These limits can be conceived in terms of the early Confucian idea of timeliness (時): Confucians emphasize the importance of taking an appropriate attitude or action in a well-timed manner, depending on various circumstances. They believe that in the kaleidoscope of life, one should flexibly adapt oneself to changing circumstances without losing faith in the core Confucian values. An important implication of this belief is that as Mencius says, if the circumstance does not allow one to advance the Confucian Dao, one should rather withdraw oneself from the world and attend to one’s own development in solitude.²⁸ Xunzi also treats such wisdom seriously throughout the text.²⁹ The claim can be made then that in the spirit of timeliness, Xunzi would say that while one may adopt some strategic ways of dealing with a corrupt or violent ruler, this is only true up to a limit, namely only if there is still some chance of success in changing the ruler.

The characterization of the ancillary motivation is not an issue raised by Xunzi. Even so, the discussion of this paper provides a meaningful viewpoint for anyone who follows Xunzi’s suggestions in the “Zhongni” and “Chendao” chapters. In difficult circumstances and times in which one unavoidably serves a violent superior, one needs to check if any extra motive involved in taking the attitude of polite deference or humility toward the superior is not a self-interested desire, including a desire merely for self-preservation, but rather the kind of ancillary one that aims ultimately to attain the Confucian ideal in the long run.

Acknowledgments

This paper is partly based upon the author’s previous paper in Korean: “Qian (謙) in the Xunzi,” Chung Kuk Hak Po (Journal of Chinese Studies) vol. 76 (2016). I have benefited from the helpful comments by the audience and commentators. I also appreciate the two anonymous reviewers of this paper. Especially I am grateful to Philip J. Ivanhoe for having given me the opportunity to present the first version of this paper at Center for East Asian and Comparative Philosophy, City University of

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