The Political and Social Thought of Mou Zongsan

I. Why This Topic?

The ideal life of a whole-heartedly devoted Confucian is typically described in terms of being “a sage within and a king without” (neisheng waiwang 內聖外王). They seek to perfect themselves morally through self-cultivation but then go on to apply their moral character by helping to implement a benevolent form of government. Neo-Confucian luminaries such as Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200) are not exceptions to this ideal, as professor Yu Ying-shih 余英時 meticulously has revealed in his masterpiece on Zhu Xi and the political culture of the Song dynasty (Yu 2003, 2004). Modern and contemporary Confucians also do not confine themselves exclusively to the side of being a “sage within”; they, too, have practical political agendas and seek to implement their moral teachings by participating in formulating or at least guiding governmental policies. As one of the most seminal thinkers in the modern Confucian tradition, Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909-95) has received a great deal of attention in contemporary scholarship. Nevertheless, thusfar, the attention of most academics has been focused almost exclusively on his moral philosophy, especially his moral metaphysics. The philosophical edifice that Mou constructed, including his interpretation of traditional Chinese philosophy, Daoism, Chinese Buddhism, and Confucianism, and his own constructive philosophical system, which incorporates important ideas and approaches from Western philosophy, especially Kant, into Chinese philosophy, is both impressive and important. On the other hand, the political and social concerns that were strongly and continuously expressed throughout his entire life and that clearly played a major role in motivating his philosophical reflections are an essential dimension of his larger intellectual world. His political and social concerns are critical for fully understanding Mou as not only a philosopher but as an intellectual responding to the political and social issues of his time.This article will focus on Mou’s political and social thought. The structure and selected themes presented here are based on his own writings and not imposed as part of some theoretical perspective imported from outside. The topics discussed comprehensively cover the major aspects of his political and social thought. There are, of course, other fascinating aspects of his philosophy; however, they are parts of different stories and will not be discussed in this article.

There are sporadic studies of various aspects of Mou’s political philosophy—in particular in regard to his views concerning democracy¹—to be found in the contemporary literature; almost all of these studies approach his writings from the distinct perspective of “political philosophy” and unavoidably are imbued with their Vorurteil, mostly various discourses of western political philosophy. But the richness of the political and social thought of Mou extends far beyond the boundary of political philosophy. To fully grasp the range and depth of Mou’s political and social thought, we need to tease out the full spectrum of his views from his voluminous and varied writings and scrutinize these within their historical and intellectual setting, combining a close reading of evidential materials with careful philosophical arguments.

II. Responses to and Critiques of Marxism

In the beginning of the 1930s, when Mou was still a student at Peking University, Marxism enjoyed immense popularity in China. Mou obviously could not fail to be moved by the spirit of this time, but he did not simply follow the general trend. Unlike most Chinese intellectuals who were trying to look at Chinese history from a Marxist perspective and to diagnose the structure and challenges of Chinese society of the day by applying Marxism in a mechanical and uncritical manner, Mou criticized Marxism from the very beginning of his academic career. For example, the first article he published in 1931, when he was only 22 years old, was a defense of the kind of traditional logic initiated by Aristotle and a response to the materialistic dialectics advocated by many Chinese believers in Marxism as a “new logic” that could replace the traditional one (Mou 2003, vol. 25, 3-12).² The central argument of this article was that the three basic laws of formal logic, i.e. the law of identity, the law of contradiction, and the law of excluded middle, as irreducible forms of human thought, could not be overthrown by Marxist materialistic dialectics through its so-called “dialectical logic.” Mou was immersed in modern logic for a long time and his achievements in this area were arguably unparalleled in the twentieth century China (Wang 2007, chaps. 1-8). It is no doubt true that his mastery of modern logic is a primary reason why his arguments not only concerning the reconstruction of Chinese philosophy but also concerning his political and social thought are so precise and forceful.³

Once Marxism prevailed in China in the early twentieth century, not only was materialistic dialectics worshiped as a new form of logic, but historical materialism was also applauded as a universally applicable methodology. Most Chinese intellectuals in the 1930s tried to reinterpret Chinese history by using the Marxist theory of historical materialism, dividing China’s history into dedicated stages, defining the nature of each of these, and seeing the course of history as the unfolding of a predetermined trajectory with a clear and inevitable telos. Many of the most influential intellectuals of the time published their competing articles in the Journal of Reading (Dushu zazhi 讀書雜誌), including Guo Moruo 郭沫若 (1892-1978), Hu Qiuyuan 胡秋原 (1910-2004), Li Ji 李季 (1892-1967), Tao Xisheng 陶希聖 (1899-1988), Wang Lixi 王禮錫 (1901-39), Zhu Qihua 朱其華 (1907-45), and so on. They divided up and explained China’s history in various and irreconcilable ways, but the basic theoretical framework or methodology they employed was one: historical materialism, especially the five-stage schema of historical development, which was reputedly initiated by Lenin and Stalin, not Marx or even Engels. Mou examined almost every representative point of view of this kind and refuted them one by one. His arguments were specific and detailed. But the central point of his critique was that historical materialism, as a theory based simply upon Marx’s European experience and limited knowledge of ancient Indian society, could not serve as a universally valid methodology for observing and interpreting Chinese history and society. As he said, “When we study Chinese society, we must take it as a living organism, which has its own development. We cannot take the history of Western society as our standard nor can we analyze Chinese society with meanings taken from the terms of the form of Western society” (Mou 2003, 735).⁴ Obviously, in Mou’s view, it was invalid to divide the stages of Chinese history and define the nature of Chinese society by drawing a forced analogy to the history and nature of Western society (Peng 2016, 117-78).

Given that China remained a rural society throughout the 1930s, the issue of rural China became a laboratory to employ and test the newly imported Marxism. Aside from a few Chinese intellectuals, such as Yan Yangchu 晏陽初 and Liang Shuming 梁漱溟, who tried to practically improve the situation in rural China through education at the very beginning of this period (Zheng 2000), most Chinese scholars tried to analyze the problems of rural China and formulate prescriptions for addressing its various maladies by employing Marxism. As part of this general movement, Mou also addressed the issues facing rural China; not only did he comment upon the various Marxist schemes that were being offered in his day as solutions, but he also offered his own observations about rural China and proposed a constructive program aimed at modernizing it.

Although most contemporary intellectuals followed one another in using Marxism as their interpretive framework and methodology, their diagnoses of the nature of rural China split along two contrasting lines: regarding it either as capitalist or feudal. In Mou’s view, however, rural China was neither capitalist nor feudal. Not bound by the constraints of Marxist dogma, Mou was able to present his own assessment and judgment about the nature of rural China and develop his own original approach to resolving its problems. One point that needs to be added here is that Mou’s stress on the crucial role played by the economy in defining the nature and challenges of rural China, intriguingly, seems unconsciously influenced by Marxism in some sense.

Of particular note, Mou was the first to argue that the construction of rural China should give priority to economic improvement rather than intellectual education. In a set of articles published in 1935 (Mou 2003, vol. 26, 777-84; 801-10; 811-24),⁵ Mou drew upon his rural background and experience to analyze the situation in rural China, pointing out that the most urgent and pressing issue for the vast majority of peasants living in the hinterlands of China was not education but survival. The well-known leaders of “the movement of constructing rural China” (xiangcun jianshe yundong 鄉村建設運動), such as Yan Yangchu and Liang Shuming, did not realize this point until 1935, when the effort no longer was able to be implemented (Peng 2016, chap. 3). In addition to these specific writings in the 1930s, which were offered as responses to and critiques of the application of Marxism to the particular problem of rural China, Mou’s critical reflections on Marxism and Communism were featured in a small book called “The Critiques of the Communist International and the Chinese Communist Party 共產國際與中共批判,” published in 1952.

In this book, Mou severely criticized the Communist understanding of “family, ”country,” and “great unity” by contrasting these with the corresponding Confucian conceptions (Peng 2016, chap. 4). For him, the incompatibility between the understanding of Confucianism as a form of “humanistic idealism” and Marxism underpinned by materialism in regard to these ideas was due to their fundamentally different and incompatible understandings of human nature. While a typical Confucian believes in a common human nature described by Mengzi in his vivid depiction of the “four sprouts of the heart-mind” (siduanzhixin 四端之心), namely, the “feeling of commiseration” (ceyin zhixin 惻隱之心), the “feeling of shame and dislike” (xiuwu zhixin 羞惡之心), the “feeling of deference and compliance” (cirang zhixin 辭讓之心), and the “feeling of right and wrong” (shifei zhixin 是非之心), a Marxist does not believe in the existence of a common human nature at all. Given the fact that the regime was taken over by the Chinese Communist Party in 1949, it is understandable that the systematic articulation of his critique of Marxism and Communism represented by this book appeared in 1952. Intriguingly, this book was unknown to readers of Mou’s work, including his students and followers and therefore was not included in Mou’s Complete Works published in 2003 in Taipei. It was discovered in 2004 by this article’s author while conducting archival research at the Harvard-Yenching Institute.

III. Advocacy of Democracy and Freedom Based upon Critical Reflection

Since the early twentieth century, democracy and freedom, in addition to science, have been two targets that almost all Chinese intellectuals have pursued, even though opinions on various matters among them often diverged. In this regard, Mou was not exceptional. As a matter of fact, his critique of Marxism and Communism and his embrace of democracy and freedom should be regarded as two sides of the same coin. Also, both sides for Mou proved to be lifetime endeavors.

Until the publication by Peng (2016) on Mou’s political and social thought, almost all publications on Mou’s political thought, in Chinese and in Western languages as well, have been limited to his discussion of democracy.⁶ Which of Mou’s observations on traditional Chinese politics served as the basis for his endorsement of democracy? Did he embrace democracy as an institution from the West without any reservations? How did he understand the relationship between democracy and Confucian core values? There are explicit articulations in Mou’s own works concerning each of these questions, which, unfortunately, have largely remained untouched for too long a time.

Mou’s endorsement of democracy was not a conclusion based on purely theoretical speculation. Rather, it was founded upon his observations on and analysis of traditional Chinese political institutions and governance. In his view, traditional Chinese politics, at least from the Qin dynasty until the Qing dynasty, could be understood as a triatic structure constituted by the “emperor” (jun 君), “scholar-officials” (shi 士), and the “common people” (min 民). Within this political structure, these three constituents remained unstable and volatile. The transition from one emperor to the next was always realized by either rebellion or hereditary system, neither of which offered a sustainably secure and smooth transfer of power. While the status of scholar-officials was open to the common people with the institutionalization of civil service examination system, righteous and disobedient scholar-officials were often exiled, lost their privileges and were degraded to the status of common people, or lost their very lives. The vast majority of the oppressed common people could do nothing more than covet the emperorship from a position of despair and desperation. Mou believed that democracy offered the only and indispensable path for a politically modern China that could avoid and untie the three forces that remained deadlocked in traditional forms of governance and doomed the monarchy that dominated Chinese politics for more than two thousand years; namely, the unlimited power of the emperor, the unwarranted political engagement of scholar-officials, and the impossibility of political participation by the common people. His often-quoted yet also often misunderstood judgment, “you zhidao wu zhengdao 有治道無政道,” which literally means “having a way to rule but lacking a way to govern,” actually means that educated and able people can be widely recruited to work for the government while the regime itself is under the exclusive control of one family, represented by the emperor, and offers a precise summary of his observations on the structure and deadlocks that plagued traditional Chinese monarchy (Mou 2003, vol. 10).

On the other hand, Mou was clear that democracy is not perfect or ideal but is the least bad political system in human history. He argued that democracy alone is not enough to construct a humane and civilized society of caring human beings. In addition to democratic political institutions, he argued, values such as “humaneness” (ren 仁), “rightness” or “justice” (yi 義), “ritual” or “civility” (li 禮), “wisdom” (zhi 智), and “trust” (xin 信) that Confucianism particularly advocated could and should play an important role. This means that Mou did not embrace Western democracy without any reservations. It is not fair to criticize modern new Confucians such as Mou or others such as Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909-78) or Xu Fuguan 徐復觀 (1904-82) for uncritically and completely accepting and simply seeking to reproduce Western democracy in China.

Mou’s concern for democracy is not only theoretical but also practical. For example, he paid a great deal of attention to the democratic movement in the mainland after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. At every significant historical moment, for example, the student movement fighting for democracy in 1989, he offered comments and gave his advice to support such efforts and pointed out their shortcomings and challenges as well. (Peng 2016, 430-42)

In addition to democracy, the ideas of “freedom” and “liberalism” received equal attention from Mou as well. For him, freedom is also a value and institution that Chinese people should and must pursue in their quest for modernization, and he offered a careful analysis of what this freedom entailed. Mou first made a distinction between moral freedom and political freedom. He called these two types of freedom “subjective freedom” (zhuguan ziyou 主觀自由) and “objective freedom” (keguan ziyou 客觀自由), respectively. This terminology was obviously borrowed from Hegel, but Mou’s definitions of these two types of freedom are different. Indeed, his distinction and definitions are reminiscent of and, in certain respects, similar to Isaiah Berlin’s concepts of “positive liberty” and “negative liberty,” though it seems that Mou had no familiarity with Berlin or his analysis of freedom. Mou further argued that the spirit of freedom developed in Chinese tradition is more moral rather than political. As he said,

Kongzi, Mengzi, and neo-Confucian scholars surely often talked about enlightenment and self-determination, which, of course, entails individuality and freedom. Butthis is primarily in the sense of morality. It is subjective freedom; therefore, it results in character building and the pursuit of sagehood. It is, however, not objective freedom; therefore, it could not establish political freedom in its modern sense.⁷ (Mou 2003, vol. 28, 165)

At the same time, Mou also added that political freedom is not completely alien to the Chinese people, especially to Confucian intellectuals epitomized by Mengzi.⁸ Based upon these points, Mou argued that political freedom was urgently needed for Chinese modernization.

On the one hand, Mou stressed that political freedom, which was well-developed in the West, should be introduced and integrated into Chinese political thought and practice. On the other, he further discussed his understanding of the relationship between moral freedom and political freedom. In his view, the cleavage between these two types of freedom is not altogether pertinent, though the relatively independent spheres of the two should be acknowledged. For Mou, without moral freedom as a backup, political freedom alone cannot ensure a civilized society. This point resonates with the views of some modern Western philosophers such as Judith N. Shklar (1928-92).⁹ It is exactly in this sense that Mou, who could be regarded as a Confucian liberal, was differentiated from the other Chinese liberalists such as Zhang Foquan 張佛泉 (1908-94), Yin Haiguang 殷海光 (1919-69), and others on the intellectual landscape of twentieth-century China.¹⁰ Mou even raised the criticism that political freedom in the modern West deviated from its classical spirit, which was, according to his understanding, precisely rooted in the spirit of moral freedom. In this sense, similar to his attitude toward democracy, Mou did not completely or uncritically embrace political liberalism imported from the West. He was always based in the Chinese, especially Confucian, tradition and absorbed and adapted Western sources only after critical reflection. For example, he even presented his own translation and interpretation of the English word, “liberalism.” In his view, more pertinent and accurate Chinese translations of liberalism would be “kuanrong zhuyi 寬容主義,” “kuaunren zhuyi 寬任主義,” or “kuanren zhuyi 寬忍主義” rather than “ziyou zhuyi 自由主義” (Mou 2003, vols. 23, 39-40).

Mou’s understanding of freedom and liberalism from a Confucian perspective contributes not only a resource to revise political liberalism but an alternative to going beyond the simple dichotomy and demarcation between liberalism and communitarianism. If we use liberalism and communitarianism as twin perspectives from which to look at Confucianism as a form of political thought, Confucianism is somewhere in between (Peng 2009, 327-32). Mou has the same standpoint.

IV. On the Relationship between Mainland China and Taiwan

Mou left the mainland for Taiwan and Hong Kong in 1949 and spent the rest, i.e. more than half, of his life outside the mainland. Except for a couple of short visits to Shenzhen to take his two granddaughters from Shandong province (Mou’s hometown) to Taiwan and Hong Kong, Mou never went back to mainland China. Even though he was invited quite a few times by various institutions from mainland China for conferences dedicated to exploring his thought, Mou turned them down without any hesitation. He explicitly claimed that he would go back to the mainland right away as soon as the Chinese government gave up Marxism as a national ideology. Meanwhile, he witnessed the strivings of the Taiwanese people for independence. So, understandably, the issue of the relation across the Taiwan Strait, including how to understand the identity of the Taiwanese and the democratic movement in mainland China, also constitute integral parts of the political and social thought of Mou, especially in his later years.

As for the relationship between the mainland and Taiwan, Mou insisted that Taiwan should be understood as the reservoir of Chinese tradition and that the Republic of China rather than the People’s Republic China should be taken as the legitimate representative of the Chinese people. In this sense, Mou supported Taiwan’s political independence as the continuation of the Republic of China and the representative and reservoir of traditional Chinese culture. For example, in a lecture delivered at New Asia Institute in Hong Kong in 1981, Mou explicitly pointed out that “abandoning the four basic principles to which the Chinese Communist Party adheres should be the precondition for peace talks between mainland China and Taiwan” (Mou 2003, vol. 23, 122-23).¹¹

By the same token, Mou expressed his worry about and dissent concerning the increasing local striving for the independence of Taiwan, which, in his view, is an inadvisable and harmful attempt that leads Taiwan to deviate from its proper cultural matrix. In Mou’s view, without its Chinese heritage, Taiwan, existing simply as a small and independent island nation, is far from being the center with which members of the Chinese diaspora can identify and could not play an important role in the world. As he pointedly said,

If Taiwan is not able to realize this cultural direction (inheriting the tradition of Chinese culture), is not able to, politically, move toward democracy, and is not able to assume responsibility for the mainland, for example, if it wants to be independent and self-established, it would be alright if its independence eventually leads to self-establishment, but if it becomes independent without establishing itself that would be tragic. How can it establish itself? On one level, Taiwan should connect itself with Chinese culture and history and the orthodox regime of Republic of China in order to hold on to its position; on another, Taiwan should be aware that the billion people living in the mainland are an integral part of the Chinese nation, they all long for the unification of China as a nation-state. If Taiwan is unable to connect itself with history or with the great mass of people on the mainland, its independence would be “isolation.” It would only amount to a lonely type of independence in which [as Chen Zi’ang¹² said] “Unable to look back to the ancients, unable to look forward to those to come; Reflecting on the distance between heaven and earth, isolated and lonely, tears fall.” This is not self-establishment but unrooted floating about. If one cannot establish oneself, hoping that another country will come and carry one along is something that cannot be relied upon.¹³ (Mou 2003, vol. 24, 366-67)

Simply put, for Mou, Taiwan should politically adhere to its independence as the continuation of the Republic of China. This provides the foundation for claiming that the People’s Republic of China must truly abandon Marxism and Maoism as its national ideology as the precondition for the unity of the mainland and Taiwan. On the other hand, Mou also stressed that Taiwan should culturally identify with its Chinese legacy and that only by sticking to Chinese culture and an improved form of democracy could Taiwan play a central role for the Chinese community in the world.

V. Concluding Remarks

In sum, philosophically, Mou’s lifelong endeavor was to develop Chinese philosophy by pursuing a continuous dialogue with the Western philosophical tradition, especially Kant. Politically, the central idea to which Mou also was devoted throughout his entire life is, on the one hand, to fight Marxism and Communism in order to uphold the core values of the Chinese tradition in general and of Confucianism in particular and, on the other, to integrate Confucianism and political liberalism. For Mou, Confucian ideals, which are compatible with values such as democracy and freedom, are alien to what Communism and Marxism fundamentally advocate; the pursuit of modern China should accordingly be carried out through the integration of Confucian and Western core values, i. e. humaneness, justice, civility, wisdom, trust, and democracy, freedom, and human rights. Of course, these two sides, the philosophical and political, are mutually integrated and reinforce one another. In this sense, although a modern philosopher, Mou is still a traditional Confucian intellectual whose action and life were identical with his knowledge and faith. Also, the way to integrate Confucianism and political liberalism—once called “the third force” in the 1940s-1950s (Zhang 1952)—suggested by Mou and a few of his like-minded contemporaries, such as Tang Junyi 唐君毅, Xu Fuguang 徐復觀, and, especially, Zhang Junmai 張君勱 (Carsun Chang, 1887-1969), is still relevant and instructive to today’s China.

References

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