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The Role of Ancillary Motivations in Xunzi's Thought

Doil Kim*

Abstract

This paper focuses on some passages in the *Xunzi* 荀子 where Xunzi can be understood as allowing typical Confucian attitudes or modes of behavior such as polite deference or humility to be driven by a wrong motive such as self-interest, and explains why this understanding is mistaken in a broader context of the text. Even though Xunzi does not accept that one can take the Confucian attitudes or actions entirely out of self-interest, it is hard to deny that in those passages of concern, he allows the intervention of a certain extra motive that differs from the proper motives for the ideal Confucian attitudes or actions. For this reason, this paper characterizes the extra motive under the convenient label of an "ancillary motivation" and explains how it intervenes and operates in a benign way, namely by advancing the core Confucian values ultimately.

Keywords: Xunzi 荀子, ancillary motivations, deference, humility, the problem of wrong motivations, motivational purity, *cheng* 誠.

*Doil Kim is an Associate Professor in the Department of Confucian Studies, Eastern Philosophy and Korean Philosophy, Sungkyunkwan University. E-mail: philosokim@gmail.com

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I. Introduction

Early Confucians suggest various attitudes or modes of behavior, such as respectfulness, carefulness, polite deference, and humility. These are adopted to practice the core Confucian values or principles, such as *Dao* 道 (the Way), *renli* 仁義 (the Confucian formal rules of conduct), and *liyi* 禮義 (propriety). At some point, however, Xunzi seems to allow one to take those attitudes or actions out of self-interest. More particularly, in the "Zhongni" 仲尼 chapter, Xunzi appears to suggest that the king's subject should take some of the aforementioned attitudes or actions to win the king's favor and be chosen as his minister. If this reading is correct, Xunzi allows one's self-interest, rather than the proper motives, namely a desire for realizing the core Confucian values, to provide at least part of the motivation that leads one to take the Confucian attitudes or actions. For convenience, I call this "the problem of wrong motivations." In fact, the above reading is not correct when considered in the broader context of the *Xunzi*. I suggest another reading of the relevant passages that does not evoke the problem of wrong motivations.

On the other hand, the above reading is not entirely misleading because it cannot be denied that in the relevant passages Xunzi considers the intervention of a certain extra motive to be sometimes inevitable in addition to the proper motives for pursuing the core Confucian values. The question is how to characterize this extra motive in a way that avoids the problem of wrong motivations.

Moreover, in handling this question, there is another criterion that the characterization of the extra motive should meet, namely motivational purity. For Xunzi, one should be motivated single-heartedly to pursue the core Confucian values. With this criterion in mind, I attempt to characterize the extra motive in question as "the ancillary motivation," which operates without causing one's motivational set to be impure.

II. Wrong Motivations

Scrutiny of the three tactics (術) in the "Zhongni" chapter reveals conflicting ideas among them. The first and second tactics may cause the problem of wrong motivations, whereas the third does not. The heading of the first tactic is a brief summary of the matters the tactic deals with.[1] According to this summary, the tactic is used by the minister to keep his position as the king's favorite and to maintain his political status without earning the enmity of others. To achieve these goals, Xunzi suggests, one should take up and pursue an extensive array of attitudes and actions. More particularly, he says:

> If the ruler bestows high rank on you and exalts you, be respectful (恭敬 *gongjing*) to him and restrain yourself; if the ruler trusts you and treats you closely, be careful and circumspect (謹慎 *jinshen*) and let your demeanor show as if you are wanting in, for example, ability; even if the ruler treats you with distance, strive for complete oneness with him but do not betray him. Also, when you are in a high position, do not boast; when trusted, exercise humility (謙 *qian*); when you are offered riches and benefits, accept them only after refusing (辭讓 *cirang)* them politely and deferring to the ruler first, as if your good accomplishments do not deserve them.[2]

In this tactic, Xunzi mentions many more attitudes or actions, not just respectfulness, carefulness, humility, and polite deference as in the above. As is widely understood, all of those aim to enable one to practice the core Confucian values or principles, such as *Dao*, *li*, and *li yi*. For instance, in a passage of the *Xunzi*, respectfulness is mentioned as the manifestation of *li*.[3] In the same passage, the gentleman (君子 *junzi*) is described as someone who finds ease in *li* and takes the attitude of carefulness, so that he would not do wrong

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1 "持寵處位終身不厭之術." See Li (2000, 246).

2 As to this translation of the part of the first tactic, I partially consult John Knoblock's. See Knoblock (1988-94, vol. 2, 59).

3 "恭敬, 禮也. . . . 故君子安禮樂利, 謹慎而無鬥怒, 是以百舉而不過也." Li (2000, 299).

no matter what action he takes.[4] In addition, Xunzi understands polite deference as what the ideal rulers, Tang and Wu, were adept at practicing.

Similarly, the heading of the second tactic is a brief summary of its function. It explains the second tactic as a method of excelling when holding a position of great importance and handling important matters appropriately, of gaining the favor of the ruler over a state of ten thousand chariots, and of being sure to eliminate sources of possible troubles for yourself.[5] The second tactic suggests humility as well as the similar attitudes or actions mentioned above. It states, "In the conduct of official duties, the wise person, when he has the full amount, considers being deficient."[6] This figurative expression means that even after having fulfilled his duties, the wise person behaves as if he was deficient in his ability, quality, and the like. Moreover, the tactic ends by quoting the following saying of Confucius: "If a person is wise and still devoted to *qian*, he must be a worthy."[7]

A tactic generally refers to a certain method adopted to achieve what you want, and, therefore, an attitude or action taken in the process of following a tactic inevitably evokes the thought of achieving a certain goal. The targeted goals in the headings of the first two tactics, namely winning the favor of the ruler, maintaining one's political position by not losing the favor of the ruler or one's colleagues, and still getting rid of possible troubles for oneself, are likely to provoke self-interest. For instance, if a person is respectful to others or behaves as if he does not really deserve his own accomplishments, he should be esteemed highly by others. However, if the person takes such attitudes to win the favor of a man of power and to remain in a high post, he seeks self-interest under the disguise of what is highly

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4 To focus on the current topic, I do not explain the complication involved in interpreting *qian* 謙 (humility) in the tactics in the "Zhongni" chapter. However, I already discuss it in detail, in my paper. See Doil Kim (2020).

5 "求善處大重, 理任大事, 擅寵於萬乘之國, 必無後患之術." Li (2000, 119).

6 "故知者之擧事也, 滿則慮嗛." Li (2000, 119). More extensive discussions of the relevant terms including *qian* and *qian** 嗛 (deficiency) in this passage is presented in the aforementioned paper. See Footnote 4.

7 "孔子曰, . . . 知而好謙, 必賢. 此之謂也." Li (2000, 119-120).

esteemed. Here, in the worst case, selfishness is camouflaged with a hypocritical attitude or action. Otherwise, at least, the Confucian attitudes or actions are motivated wrongly out of self-interest. In such cases, the problem of wrong motivations can arise.

This suspicion grows stronger when the first two tactics are compared with the third, which has a different heading, "the tactic that can work for every occasion over the world."[8] By drawing upon this third tactic, Xunzi explains, you will gain mastery in serving the ruler and become a sage in developing your personhood.[9] This tactic also suggests attitudes or actions very similar to those mentioned above. Unlike the previous tactics, however, it suggests that one should adopt these attitudes or actions in a way that enables one to stand firm with the Confucian ideals (*lilong* 立隆) single-heartedly (*wuyi* 勿貳).[10] The term *long* 隆 here refers to the core Confucian values or principles.[11] The ultimate goal of using the third tactic, then, lies not in winning the ruler's favor or avoiding any personal troubles in the future, but in practicing the Confucian core values or principles. In other words, the reason why one should not brag about one's own accomplishments in the presence of the ruler is not that one wants not to lose the favor of the ruler, but that one can thereby be in compliance with the core Confucian values or principles. Thus understood, the adoption of this tactic does not provoke the problem of wrong motivations.

The disagreement between the first and the second tactics on the one hand and the third tactic on the other needs to be resolved to understand Xunzi's thought more consistently. Prior to an attempt

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8 "天下之行術." See Li (2000, 121).

9 "天下之行術, 以事君則必通, 以爲仁則必聖." In interpreting this sentence, I follow Zhang Jue's Chinese translation. See Zhang Jue (2015, 107). As to a similar interpretation, see Xiong Gongzhe (1995, 110). Knoblock's interpretation of the sentence is somewhat different. See Knoblock (1988-94, vol. 2, 61).

10 "立隆而勿貳也, 然後恭敬以先之, 忠信以統之, 愼謹以行之, 端慤以守之." In the above, I consult Knoblock's translation. See Knoblock (1988-94, vol. 2, 61).

11 The following annotators interpret *long* 隆 as *dao* 道: Wang Xianqian (1988, 113); Xiong Gongzhe (1995, 110); Kim Hak-ju (2001, 169). Zhang Jue interprets it as *liyi* 禮義. See Zhang Jue (2015, 107). Knoblock translates it as an high ideal and understands it as referring to *Dao* or *li* 禮. See Knoblock (1988-94, vol. 2, 61). In the "Lilun" 禮論 chapter of the *Xunzi*, the same expression *lilong* 立隆 appears. In that context, it is obvious that long refers to *li* 禮. "禮豈不至矣哉. 立隆以為極, 而天下莫之能損益也." See Li (2000, 427).

to resolve it in the following section, it is worth noting that another passage in the *Xunzi* may evoke the problem of wrong motivations. In the "Chendao" chapter, Xunzi says,

> "If one is persecuted and oppressed by a chaotic age, reduced to a life of utter poverty in a violent state, and one lacks any means to escape, then one should promote the lord's refinements, and extol his goodness, avoid his ugliness and conceal his failures, speak of his virtues but never refer to his shortcomings. Make this one's established customs."[12]

This suggestion sounds like a survival technique that one might adopt in a predicament, as Xunzi seems to suggest that one should ingratiate oneself with one's superior by covering up his faults and highlighting only his merits. Then, one's attitudes or actions toward the superior may be driven by one's self interest. If this reading of the above passage is correct, Xunzi's suggestion provokes the problem of wrong motivations.

III. Xunzi's Warning against Flattery

The disagreement among the three tactics cannot be resolved within the context of the "Zhongni" chapter. Even so, the previous readings of the passages in the "Chendao" and "Zhongni" chapters are misleading in consideration of a broader context of the *Xunzi*. Throughout the "Chendao" chapter, Xunzi criticizes ingratiation or flattery.

More particularly, for instance, Xunzi introduces the four grades of good and bad ministers, namely sham ministers (態臣 *taichen*), presumptuous ministers, meritorious ministers, and sage ministers, and then criticizes sham minsters.[13] One of its Chinese characters *tai* 態 means "looks" or "appearance," and it is used in the expression *tai*

[12] As to this interpretation, I mostly follow Zhang jue's (2015, 185). In addition, I consult Hutton's and Knoblock's in terms of the translation. See Hutton (2014, 136) and Knoblock (1988-94, vol. 2, 200).

[13] "人臣之論, 有態臣者, 有篡臣者, 有功臣者, 有聖臣者." Li (2000, 289). As to the above translations of each grade, see Knoblock (1988-94, vol. 2, 197).

chen to refer to the appearance of flattering the ruler.[14] In detail, Xunzi describes sham minsters as follows:

> "Not only are they ill-equipped at unifying the people inside of the state, but they are also ill-equipped to repel disturbances from outside. The hundred clans feel no kinship with them, and the feudal lords do not trust them. Nevertheless, they are cunning and nimble, and they are a sleek talker; thus they are good at winning favors from their superiors."[15]

Here, his criticism of flattery is clear. In addition, in the same chapter, Xunzi exhorts one not to flatter a mediocre ruler but only to remonstrate and wrangle with him.[16] In the relevant passages, Xunzi draws distinctions among different levels of rulers, namely a sage ruler (聖君), a mediocre ruler (中君), and a violent ruler (暴君), and suggests different treatments in interacting with each of them. Xunzi also says that the practice of *yi* in the service of a mediocre ruler lies in being loyal and truthful without ingratiating oneself with the ruler, and in remonstrating and wrangling with him without being dishonest through flattery (Li 2000, 295). Xunzi is clearly opposed to flattery that seeks personal benefit. In line with this firm position, the first two tactics in the "Zhongni" chapter should be read differently.

IV. The Model of Mixed Motivations

Then, how can the first two tactics be re-interpreted in a way that avoids the problem of wrong motivations? A possible way around this trouble is to reconsider the selfish desires that intervene in adopting the tactics to be only secondary. For example, one may be *qian* (humble) on the basis of a combination of different motivations rather than a single one, and the principal motivation is independent

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14 See Wang Xianqian (1988, 247) and Zhang (2015, 274).

15 "內不足使一民, 外不足使距難, 百姓不親, 諸侯不信, 然而巧敏佞說, 善取寵乎上, 是態臣者也." Li (2000, 289).

16 "事中君者, 有諫爭無諂諛." Li (2000, 294).

of the selfish motivations that only intervene secondarily. In other words, such a selfish motive for maintaining one's own political position by not losing the favor of one's superior can be understood as playing a subordinate role to the proper and primary motive for practicing the core Confucian values or principles. In this line of thought, it can be argued that insofar as the primary motive for being humble is independent of the selfish ones, one can sidestep the problem of wrong motivations.

The phenomenon of intervention by such subordinate motivations is common in our experience. In everyday life, human beings do not always act exclusively with a single motivation. For example, while a person extends efforts to help someone else out of sympathy, he may simultaneously be motivated to pursue a personal sense of happiness by carrying out such good deeds. This additional motivation is self-interested. Nevertheless, it does not make the agent completely misguided in helping the other, insofar as it does not become the stronger and encroach on the other motive. This model of mixed motivations may accommodate a richer and more concrete view of human actions in daily life. Moreover, Xunzi does not completely reject the pursuit of personal benefits. He approves of it on the condition that the pursuit does not violate the core Confucian values or principles. In this regard, he says that the gentleman desires personal advantages (利 *li*), and, yet, he would not do things of which he disapproves.[17]

Furthermore, this model has the theoretical advantage of uncovering what Xunzi may implicitly have in mind when he suggests the three different tactics of the "Zhongni" chapter in a sequential manner. Perhaps, Xunzi considers the process of self-cultivation, in the beginning of which human beings whose nature is selfish according to his widely known thesis that human nature is bad should have difficulty in following the Confucian *Dao* as such without having in mind any personal gain. For this reason, Xunzi may try to encourage a layperson in self-cultivation by following the first and second tactics, which partly allows the intervention of selfish motivations. According

[17] "義之所在, 不傾於權, 不顧其利, 舉國而與之不為改視, 重死持義而不橈, 是士君子之勇也." Li (2000, 58).

to this line of thought, the third tactic is what can be adopted by a well cultivated person who can follow the Confucian *Dao* without being helped by any subordinate motivation. In contrast, the first and second tactics have more to do with Xunzi's conception of how a person should act in the process of self-cultivation rather than his conception of how a person should ideally act.[18]

The above lines of thought may be developed in a more detailed manner. Nevertheless, I do not steer the following discussion in that direction. In fact, Xunzi does not indicate such different levels of self-cultivation in terms of the three tactics in the "Zhongni" chapter, nor does he throughout the *Xunzi.*

On the other hand, the problematic motive in question may be understood not as a selfish one, but as an indispensable desire for self-preservation. In the "Rongru" chapter, Xunzi claims that the gentleman and the petty man are the same in liking what is beneficial and hating what is harmful.[19] According to this, it can be claimed further that a gentleman, namely a well-cultivated person, may sometimes take polite deference mainly out of a proper motive for it, while having another desire for self-preservation in order to avoid harm against himself. Out of the latter, he may adopt the first or second tactic in the "Zhongni" chapter, thereby trying to win the favor of his superior. This extra motive can be a survival instinct for self-preservation in a predicament like dwelling "in a violent state" (in the "Chendao" chapter), rather than a selfish desire to increase one's own private interests. The intervention of this extra desire may not be completely problematic from the perspective of early Confucians, if this need for self-preservation does not encroach upon the proper motives for taking the typical Confucian attitudes or actions.

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[18] If this understanding of Xunzi is correct, Mencius should oppose Xunzi. Mencius draws the distinction between doing what is proper while being so naturally inclined and forcing oneself to do what is proper, with rejecting the latter. In contrast, Xunzi takes a positive attitude toward forcing oneself to do what is proper while not being so naturally inclined. With respect to this view of Xunzi's, see the "Xinge" 性惡 chapter of the *Xunzi*; especially, see Li (2000, 540). Regarding the understanding of Mencius just explained, see Shun (1997, 157-158).

[19] "好利惡害, 是君子小人之所同也." Li (2000, 60).

V. The Criterion of Motivational Purity

No matter how the extra motive under discussion is understood, Xunzi would not accept the model of mixed motivations when understood in the form explained in the previous section. Even though Xunzi does not completely reject the pursuit of personal benefits, he firmly believes that the gentleman should courageously not look after his own benefit in meeting the requirement of *yi*.[20] In this regard, attention needs to be paid to the third tactic in the "Zhongni" chapter that asks one to take the Confucian attitudes or actions by standing firm with the Confucian ideals single-heartedly. This suggestion is another criterion to meet when a person ideally acts.

More particularly, as soon as any self-interested motivation intervenes in the mind of an agent in acting to pursue the Confucian values, the purity in his mind cannot help being contaminated. This loss of purity prevents the agent from being driven wholeheartedly by proper motives. In the case of Mencius, another early Confucian thinker, the basic motivation for urgently reaching for a crawling baby who is about to fall into a well is *ceyin zhixin* (惻隱之心), namely compassion for the impending pain to which the baby is clearly exposed. Mencius asserts that no motivation other than the compassion, especially any selfish one, intervenes in such an urgent situation (Yang 1996, 79-80). For instance, the desire to gain recognition from the village for the good deed, or to continue acquaintance with the baby's parents for a selfish purpose, should not enter into the agent's mind. The agent could presumably be all the more motivated to help the crawling baby by virtue of such

[20] "義之所在, 不傾於權, 不顧其利, 舉國而與之不為改視, 重死持義而不橈, 是士君子之勇也." (Li 2000, 58). Knoblock's translation for this passage is the following: "Staying with [*yi*] not swayed by the exigencies of the moment, not given to looking after his own benefit, elevating the interests of the whole state and assisting in realizing them, not acting to change his point of view, weighing the threat of death but upholding *yi* and not backing away from it- such is the courage of the scholar and gentleman." See Knoblock (1988-94, vol. 1, 188). Here the expression "weighing the threat of death (重死)" may be based on one's desire for self-preservation, as discussed similarly in the previous section. However, in this section, I explain that this interpretation is not necessarily correct.

additional desires for selfish gains.[21] Nevertheless, this intervention is problematic from the viewpoint of motivational purity.

This idea of motivational purity is shared by Xunzi, as the aforementioned single-heartedness in the third tactic conveys this idea. It also reflects the notion of *cheng* 誠 (usually translated as sincerity), which is crucially discussed throughout many early Confucian texts, such as the *Mencius* and the "Daxue" 大學 chapter and the "Zhongyong" 中庸 chapter of the *Liji* 禮記. The "Bugou" chapter of the *Xunzi* contains a passage that promotes the notion, in which *cheng* is understood as the best way for a gentleman to cultivate his mind and make his mind have no other concern but upholding the core Confucian values.[22] At this point, it is worth noting that the neo-Confucian Zhu Xi 朱熹 understands *cheng* as pertaining to the absence of any internal division of the mind oriented solely in one of the central neo-Confucian values or principles, *li* 理.[23]

In short, the criterion of motivational purity has to do with maintaining *cheng* in the mind without the intervention of any other motives that leads to an internal division of the mind, thereby preventing the mind from being oriented entirely in pursuing the core Confucian values. Granting that Xunzi accepts the notion of *cheng*, the extra motives under discussion should be characterized without infringing the criterion of motivational purity.

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[21] Note that Mencius does not elaborate on his idea of *ce yin zhi xin* in the above way related to motivational purity, for his interest is in making the point that everyone is naturally equipped with such a moral motivation as *ce yin zhi xin*, and that this is empirically proved by the observation that everyone must act wholly upon the moral motivation, without being interrupted by any selfish desire, in an urgent situation in which a vulnerable creature is in fatal danger. This view of Mencius's quite obviously implies the motivational purity of the agent, though.

[22] "君子養心莫善於誠, 致誠則無它事矣. 惟仁之為守, 惟義之為行." Li (2000, 47).

[23] See *Zhuzi Yulei* 朱子語類 (Zhu Xi 1986, 304). Kwong-loi Shun understands *cheng* as having to do with the heart/mind's being wholly oriented in an ethical direction. See Shun (2008).

VI. The Role of Ancillary Motivations in the Benign Model of Mixed Motivations

Based on the discussions in the previous sections, I examine another possibility that Xunzi does not consider the mixture of different motivations as such to be problematic. In the "Chendao" chapter, Xunzi says,

> "If a person is worthy, and, yet, one does not respect him, this is [for one] to be a beast. If a person is unworthy, and, so, one does not respect him, this is [for one] to act like provoking a tiger. If one is like a beast, one will be in chaos. If one provokes a tiger, one will be in danger. Then disaster will reach one's own body. . . . A *ren* (仁) person always respects others. There is an appropriate way for respecting other people: If a person is worthy, one honors him and respects him. If a person is unworthy, one fears him and respects him. If a person is worthy, one gives love to him and respects him. If a person is unworthy, one keeps him at a distance and respects him. In these cases, respect that one shows is one; the actual circumstances are twofold (其情二也)."[24]

In the above passage, Xunzi explains different ways of showing respect to two kinds of people, namely a worthy person and an unworthy person. Especially, the treatment of the latter is compared to that of a tiger; in this respect, the latter is understood as a brutal person. Xunzi stresses that respect toward a brute is not different from respect toward a worthy person. In this regard, he says, "respect that one shows is one." This means that even though there are distinctive ways of respecting different kinds of people, the main motivation is still the same kind of respect.[25]

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[24] "人賢而不敬, 則是禽獸也, 人不肖而不敬, 則是狎虎也. 禽獸則亂, 狎虎則危, 災及其身矣. . . . 敬人有道. 賢者則貴而敬之, 不肖者則畏而敬之, 賢者則親而敬之, 不肖者則疏而敬之. 其敬一也, 其情二也." Li (2000, 298).

[25] The above passage from the "Chendao" chapter includes a term that requires more explanations: the *qing* 情 of the last sentence, *qiqing erye* 其情二也. First, as translated above, it may mean actual circumstances (實情). As to this interpretation, see Knoblock (1988-94, vol. 2, 203). Thus understood, it refers to the two circumstances

It is important to note how Xunzi explains the different ways of respecting, namely the ways of respecting a worthy person and a brute: He understands this difference in terms of the intervention of different attitudes or emotions, such as honoring (貴) and giving love (親), on the one hand, and fearing (畏) and keeping at a distance (疏), on the other. More particularly, according to Xunzi, one should fear a brute but nevertheless respect him because he would act like a tiger and harm one, otherwise. In the same vein, the intervention of any extra motive in adopting the first and second tactics in the "Zhongni" chapter can be understood as happening in treating a violent and brutal ruler.

However, the extra motive at issue is not necessarily a selfish desire or a basic desire for self-preservation. Instead, it needs to be characterized differently to meet the criterion of motivational purity. In the "Chendao" chapter, Xunzi points out that one's ruler is not always a sage king but more likely a tyrant. He then suggests,

> "In serving a sage king, one just needs to listen to his orders and follow him and should not remonstrate and wrangle with him. In serving a mediocre king, one needs to remonstrate and wrangle with him and should not flatter him. In serving a violent king, one needs to make up for what is lacking in him and to remove what is wrong with him and should not break with or oppose him."[26]

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in which one should show respect in different ways, mainly because the objects of respect are of different kinds.

Second, it may also mean a variety of mental attitudes, including feelings, emotions, or dispositions (情). As to this line of interpretation, see Hutton (2014, 139) and Li (2000, 299). If this is the case, the term refers to the two kinds of additional attitudes or emotions that accompany one's respect, such as honoring or giving love in relation to a worthy person on the one hand and fearing or the attitude of keeping at a distance in relation to a brutal person on the other. In fact, it cannot be determined within the context alone which is the right connotation of the term.

No matter which one is more appropriate, however, Xunzi's point in relation to the term is clearly this: The ways of respecting are twofold in relation to two kinds of object of respect, and this difference consists in the intervention of different attitudes or emotions directed distinctively to each kind of object of respect. For convenience, this kind of additional attitude or emotion may be called ancillary motivations.

[26] "事聖君者, 有聽從無諫爭. 事中君者, 有諫爭無諂諛. 事暴君者, 有補削無撟拂." Li (2000, 294).

According to this passage, when serving a sage ruler, one just needs to pursue the realization of the Confucian core values or principles simply by following the ideal ruler. In contrast, when faced with unavoidable situations where one serves a tyrant, it would be impossible to abide doggedly by the Confucian principles. Under the regime of a violent ruler, it is pivotal to avoid being ousted by losing favor with the ruler or by incurring the jealousy of fellow ministers, assuming one wants to pursue the core Confucian values and practice the Confucian principles *in the long run*. Only then could one gradually have influence on the tyrant and change him, ultimately guiding him to govern his regime in a way that is at least close to *wangdao* 王道 (the Confucian way of the true king). In this respect, Xunzi mentions in the "Chendao" chapter, "To employ the Perfect Way to enlighten the ruler, but in nothing to be inharmonious or discordant, and so be able to alter and change him, being constantly mindful of getting him to accept this. Such are one's moral obligations in the service of a cruel and violent ruler."[27]

In the process of establishing harmony with a tyrannical ruler, the desire not to lose his favor and thereby to maintain one's political position may inevitably intervene in one's attitude of serving the ruler. However, such a desire should not lead one to flatter the tyrant. Neither is it simply based on a basic desire for self-preservation. Rather, it aims ultimately at realizing the Confucian ideals in the long run, even in violent circumstances where one more often finds oneself.

Finally, the extra motive in question can be named "the ancillary motivation" to differentiate itself from the other candidates discussed so far, such as selfish desires or desires for self-preservation. It is characterized as a motive that aims at something that may simply be misrepresented as personal advantages in the short term, but that works eventually as a means to realize the core Confucian values in the long run. Then, the intervention of an ancillary motivation would not violate the criterion of motivational purity because it does not prevent one from being oriented single-heartedly in the pursuit of the core Confucian values in the long run.

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[27] "曉然以至道而無不調和也, 而能化易, 時關內之, 是事暴君之義也." Li (2000, 295).

VII. Concluding Remarks

The function of ancillary motivations cannot cross certain limits. These limits can be conceived in terms of the early Confucian idea of timeliness (時): Confucians emphasize the importance of taking an appropriate attitude or action in a well-timed manner, depending on various circumstances. They believe that in the kaleidoscope of life, one should flexibly adapt oneself to changing circumstances without losing faith in the core Confucian values. An important implication of this belief is that as Mencius says, if the circumstance does not allow one to advance the Confucian *Dao*, one should rather withdraw oneself from the world and attend to one's own development in solitude.[28] Xunzi also treats such wisdom seriously throughout the text.[29] The claim can be made then that in the spirit of timeliness, Xunzi would say that while one may adopt some strategic ways of dealing with a corrupt or violent ruler, this is only true up to a limit, namely only if there is still some chance of success in changing the ruler.

The characterization of the ancillary motivation is not an issue raised by Xunzi. Even so, the discussion of this paper provides a meaningful viewpoint for anyone who follows Xunzi's suggestions in the "Zhongni" and "Chendao" chapters. In difficult circumstances and times in which one unavoidably serves a violent superior, one needs to check if any extra motive involved in taking the attitude of polite deference or humility toward the superior is not a self-interested desire, including a desire merely for self-preservation, but rather the kind of ancillary one that aims ultimately to attain the Confucian ideal in the long run.

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28 "窮則獨善其身, 達則兼善天下." Yang (1996, 304).

29 For instance, in the "Zhongni" chapter, Xunzi says that the gentleman bends when the occasion requires bending, but straightens out when the occasion allows (故君子時詘則詘, 時伸則伸也). See Li (2000, 122).

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