Ellen Y. Zhang

DOI:10.22916/jcpc.2023..39.5 Vol.39 : 5-29

In this paper, I will explore the meaning of the Confucian “other” and its ethical implications in the light of the ethics of hospitality advocated by Lévinas and other poststructuralist philosophers in contemporary discourse. The questions I would like to raise in the paper include: Who is the “other” for Confucians? Can Confucian ren 仁 (“virtue of humanness-qua-relatedness”) reconcile the particular and the universal, or an ethics of graded love and an ethics of inclusive care? Can the Confucian concept of tianxia 天下 (“all under the heaven”) resolve a universal notion of humanity with a particularistic notion of cultural and political community? Is there such a thing as “Confucian ecumenism”? I am fully aware that whenever we bring a pre-modern intellectual tradition of the East like Confucianism into the conversation of contemporary Western ethical or political issues, we need to remind ourselves that the contemporary framework defines, to some extent, the parameter for the application of concepts and norms. But at the same time, the interpretation of an ancient tradition like Confucianism should not preclude an attempt to explore its thought and its possible connection to contemporary analogous issues within its own cultural context and form. The comparison in the paper intends to seek constructive ethical engagement in both traditions.

Hospitality, Lévinas, Confucianism, the Other, ren, shu, generosity, relationality

T. D. Nguyen

DOI: 10.22916/jcpc.2023..39.31 Vol.39 : 31-64

This paper examines 18th-century Annamese Neo-Confucian discourse on conceptual issues related to zhongguo and the hua-yi dichotomy as expressed across a diversity of 18th-century writings. I engage with Huang Chun-chieh’s theory of “contextual turn” and localized subjectivity in 18th-century East Asian Confucianisms by arguing that 18th-century Annamese Neo-Confucianism operated along a dissimilar ideological trajectory which affirmed “geographic China, poli- tical China, and cultural China” as a transdynastic and singular zhongguo from which Annam received its politico-cultural legitimation and prestige. This discourse of dependence on institutional recognition and geographical connection to the Chinese zhongguo distinguished 18th-century Annamese literati not only from contemporaneous modes of Confucian intellectuality in Japan and Joseon, but also from foundational conceptions of Vietic statehood characteristic of the early Le dynasty. My analysis of metaphysical theories invoked by 18th-century Annamese literati in their discussions of zhongguo and the rise of human civilization engages with both Huang Chun-chieh’s theory of a philological turn away from the metaphysical commitments in 18th-century East Asian Confucianisms and Alexander Woodside’s theory of pre-modern Vietnamese Confucianism being characterized by a non-metaphysical “classical primordialism.”

Bui Bich, Pham-Nguyen Dzu, Ngo Thi-Nham, zhongguo, hua-yi dichotomy

Justin Tiwald

DOI:10.22916/jcpc.2023..39.65 Vol.39 : 65-90

In this paper, I take up one of Wang Yangming’s most audacious philosophical claims, which is that an achievement that is entirely concerned with correcting one’s own inner states, called “establishing sincerity” (licheng 立誠), can help one to fully grasp all ethically pertinent matters. I begin with a reconstruction of what Wang means by “establishing sincerity” and then turn to two sets of controversies regarding his audacious claim. The first has to do with how we should understand the proposal that establishing sincerity positions a person to fully grasp all ethically significant concerns, and to what extent it makes room for investigation of external facts. The second has to do with whether we can preserve Wang’s core account of virtuous moral agency without his strong ethical nativism, according to which we achieve virtuous outcomes by relying primarily on well-formed inborn capacities rather than acquired knowledge. I consider some arguments and interpretations of Wang’s thought that might allow us to bypass his “implausibly” nativist presuppositions, and conclude that they do not succeed. Even if we cannot accept his strong ethical nativism, however, there is a range of important ethical norms for which Wang’s prescriptions are powerful and prudent.

Wang Yangming, ethical nativism, sincerity, cheng 誠, moral failure

Ming-huei Lee

DOI: 10.22916/jcpc.2023..39.91 Vol.39 : 91-128

Wang Yangming’s doctrine of the “unity of knowing and acting” (zhi xing heyi 知行合一) can be traced back to Mencius’s theory of “original knowing” (liangzhi 良知). Similarly, Kant discussed the relationship of theory to practice on three different levels (morality, the law of the state, and international law) in his article, “On the Common Saying: This May Be True in Theory, But It Does Not Apply in Practice.” Kant proposed the unity of theory and practice on the level of morality. So, this article uses Kant’s related concepts of theory and practice to interpret Wang’s doctrine of the “unity of knowing and acting” with the aim of clarifying some misinterpretations of it. Thereby, I argue that, although Wang Yangming put forward the doctrine of “the unity of knowing and acting” at a different time than his doctrines of “heart-mind is principle” (xin ji li 心即理) and “the extension of original knowing” (zhi liangzhi 致良知), these three doctrines are logically interconnected.

Wang Yangming, original knowing, unity of knowing and acting, Kant, theory and practice

Gordon B. Mower

DOI:10.22916/jcpc.2023..39.129 Vol.39 : 129-156

In general, Confucians have taken a dim view of the law. They have felt warranted in this view by a reading of Confucius’ Analects 2.3 in which the Master apparently disparages law-centered governance. Two great Confucian philosophers, however, Zhu Xi and Jeong Yakyong (widely known by his pen name, Dasan), view the role of law in society differently. Like all Confucians, they teach the cultivation of virtue, but alongside building social harmony through ritual and good character, these two philosophers perceive that social order also requires the penal law. In this paper, I argue that Zhu Xi and Dasan, and Dasan in particular, follow the evidentiary lead of the classical Chinese philosopher Mozi to support their legal philosophy. Mozi offered three standards for establishing truth claims: empirical evidence from common life, authoritative evidence, and evidence of outcomes. Mozi’s empirical standard takes evidence of common life from what ordinary people have seen. Zhu Xi and Dasan take the evidence of common life, not from what the people have seen, but from common understandings contained in the written language. They use this approach to arrive at a different understanding of Analects 2.3 than other Confucians, one that relates the content of that passage to Analects 12.17. They interpret the passage on a philological basis that supports the presence of penal law from a perspective of ordinary life. For authoritative evidence, Zhu Xi and Dasan like Mozi appeal to the authority of the ancient sages, who register their support for penal law. Dasan also follows Mozi’s evidentiary lead in the evidence of outcomes by fully developing a consequential picture of how the absence of law detrimentally affects society. On this point, Dasan establishes a new and revolutionary legal outlook that differs from that of Zhu Xi. I show Dasan taking lessons from the classical Legalists to arrive at this position warranted by the evidence of outcomes. Having satisfied the three evidentiary standards, Dasan thus establishes the importance of the penal law from a Confucian perspective.

Dasan, Law, Mozi’s Three Standards, Zhu Xi, Legalism

Shyun suhyun Ahn

DOI:10.22916/jcpc.2023..39.157 Vol.39 : 157-178

In his “Treatise on Death, Life, Ghosts, and Spirits” (Sasaeng gwisin chaek 死生 鬼神策), Yulgok Yi I (1536-1584) rejects the Buddhist accounts of an afterlife because the dead have neither vital stuff (gi 氣; C. qi) nor consciousness (jigak 知覺; C. zhijue) when their death is natural and complete. Without these, there can neither be reward nor retribution, which is the basis of an afterlife. Yet, at the same time, Yulgok commends Confucian sacrifices for the dead. When there is utmost sincerity (seong 誠; C. cheng) and pattern-principle (ri 理; C. li) to do so, the living can gather the dead’s already dissipated vital stuff. Yulgok argues that this is possible because the spirits of descendants are the spirits of their ancestors. This paper asks three questions that arise from the “Treatise” by bringing together Yulgok’s various works. First, how do the dead, with only pattern-principle, motivate the living to gather the dissipated vital stuff? Second, Yulgok explains that the living may gather the dissipated vital stuff of their ancestors by virtue of having the same spirit, but what does he mean by the “same spirit”? Third, why does Yulgok restrict certain classes from certain sacrifices when individuals can gather even the dissipated vital stuff with utmost sincerity? While answering each question, this paper aims to channel the discussions of vital stuff and objects to those of emotional and mental states, using a sacrifice as a medium.

Death, sacrifices, Neo-Confucianism, Korean philosophy, Yulgok Yi I

Sor-hoon Tan

DOI:10.22916/jcpc.2023..39.179 Vol.39 : 179-193